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Abstract
This article introduces a new way of understanding subjective probability and its
generalization to lower and upper prevision. Instead of asking whether a person is
willing to pay given prices for given risky payoﬀs, we ask whether the person believes he
can make a lot of money at those prices. If not––if the person is convinced that no
strategy for exploiting the prices can make him very rich in the long run––then the prices
measure his subjective uncertainty about the events involved.
This new understanding justiﬁes Peter Walleys updating principle, which applies
when new information is anticipated exactly. It also justiﬁes a weaker principle that is
more useful for planning because it applies even when new information is not antici-
pated exactly. This weaker principle can serve as a basis for ﬂexible probabilistic plan-
ning in event trees.
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This article introduces a new way of understanding subjective probability
and its generalization to lower and upper prevision. Instead of asking whether
a person is willing to pay given prices for given risky payoﬀs, as it is conven-
tional to do [5,33,35], we ask whether the person believes he can make a lot of
money at those prices. If not––if the person is convinced that no strategy for
exploiting the prices can make him very rich in the long run––then the prices
measure his subjective uncertainty about the events involved.
This new understanding justiﬁes Peter Walleys updating principle, which
applies when new information is anticipated exactly [33]. It also justiﬁes a
weaker principle that is more useful for planning because it applies even when
new information is not anticipated exactly.
Our analysis relies on Shafer and Vovks work on the foundations of
probability [26] and on Shafers work on event trees [22]. Shafer and Vovks
explicit game-theoretic protocols impose our distinction between a player who
oﬀers prices and a player who tries to beat them, and their version of Cournots
principle provides the basis for our analysis of updating. But event trees are
more general and more ﬂexible than Shafer and Vovks protocols, and their
generality and ﬂexibility are needed in planning.
We begin, in Section 1, by using Shafer and Vovks protocols and Cournots
principle to study subjective probabilities. In Section 2, we turn to the more
general and more complex theory of subjective lower and upper previsions
derived from limited gambling oﬀers. Readers familiar with subjective proba-
bility and with Walleys theory of lower and upper previsions will ﬁnd that
these sections cover much familiar ground. This replowing of well-tilled ﬁelds
has proven necessary for a clear presentation of the diﬀerences between our
understanding of subjective probability and prevision and the established un-
derstanding.
In Section 3, we generalize lower and upper prevision from Shafer and Vovks
protocols to event trees. In Section 4, we summarize the message of this article
and touch on some other perspectives on that message. Three appendixes deal
with some tangential topics: the origin of Cournots principle, Walleys own
presentation of his updating principle, and ‘‘incoherence’’ as a technical term.
Although we state a few mathematical results and point towards practical
problems of planning, the purpose of this article is conceptual. It clariﬁes the
informational assumptions that underlie current theories of subjective proba-
bility, and it shows how these assumptions can be relaxed and adapted to
accommodate tasks where we can foresee only some of the new information
that will come our way.
1. Subjective probability
According to the established understanding of subjective probability, set out
by Bruno de Finetti [7] and his followers, a persons beliefs are revealed by the
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bets he is willing to make. The odds at which he is willing to bet deﬁne his
probabilities. As time passes, these probabilities change according to the rule of
conditional probability: his later probability for an event is his initial condi-
tional probability for it––the condition being what he has learned in the in-
terim.
In this section, we develop a somewhat diﬀerent understanding of subjective
probability, using Shafer and Vovks game-theoretic framework [26]. In this
framework, probability is understood in terms of two players: one who oﬀers
bets, and one to whom the bets are oﬀered. We call these two players House
and Gambler, respectively. The established understanding seems to be con-
cerned with Houses uncertainty, since he is the one stating odds and oﬀering to
bet. But following Shafer and Vovk, we take Gamblers point of view. Gambler
is trying to beat the odds, and Shafer and Vovks work suggests that what
makes odds expressions of a persons uncertainty is his conviction that he
cannot beat them.
To forestall confusion, we hasten to add that Shafer and Vovk name the two
players diﬀerently than we do here. In the ﬁrst part of their book, where they
are primarily concerned with an objective conception of probability, Shafer
and Vovk call the player who oﬀers bets Forecaster and the player to whom the
oﬀers are made Skeptic. Skeptics role is to test putative objective probabilities
put forward by a theory or a forecasting method. In the second part of their
book, where they are concerned with applications to ﬁnance, Shafer and Vovk
call the player who oﬀers bets Market and the player who to whom the oﬀers
are made Investor. Our names, House and Gambler, are tailored more to the
subjective conception of probability with which we are concerned in this
article. Shafer and Vovk do not discuss this subjective conception of proba-
bility, and they do not use the names House and Gambler.
We begin this section by reviewing the established understanding (Section
1.1) and restating it in terms of explicit protocols (Section 1.2). As we explain,
the established understanding relies heavily on de Finettis principle that House
should avoid sure loss to Gambler.
We then turn to Cournots principle, which Shafer and Vovk use to give
empirical content to their protocols. Roughly speaking, Cournots principle
asserts that Gambler does not have a chance of winning heavily over the long
run. As we explain in Section 1.3, this principle can be used as the basis for
both objective and subjective interpretations of probabilities. An objective
interpretation is set up by claiming that Gambler cannot win heavily over the
long run no matter what he knows. A subjective interpretation is set up by
claiming that Gambler is convinced that he cannot win heavily over the long
run with the information he actually has.
In Section 1.4, we turn to the rule of conditional probability. We explain
how it is easily justiﬁed by the principle that House should avoid sure loss in
a protocol in which House must state in advance a rule for changing his
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probabilities (Section 1.5) and then why this easy justiﬁcation fails if no such
advance statement is required (Section 1.6). Then we explain how Cournots
principle can be used to justify the use of conditional probability for updating
exactly anticipated new information (Section 1.7). The new information here
is Gamblers, not Houses. We show that if Gambler can beat conditional
probabilities with his new information, then he would have been able to beat
initial probabilities with his initial information. Thus the assumption that
initial probabilities are valid (Gambler cannot beat them) implies that the
conditional probabilities become equally valid when the new information is
received.
In a concluding subsection (Section 1.8), we summarize our new under-
standing of subjective probability.
1.1. Oﬀering to bet
Suppose House announces a subjective probability p for an event E. What
does this announcement mean? De Finettis answer is that House is willing, or
at least disposed, to take either side of a bet on E at the odds p: ð1 pÞ.
Suppose House does state the odds p: ð1 pÞ and does oﬀer Gambler the
opportunity to bet any amount he chooses for or against E at these odds. This
means that House oﬀers Gambler the payoﬀ
að1 pÞ if E happens
ap if E fails

ð1Þ
for any real number a, which Gambler must choose immediately, before any
other information becomes available. The absolute value of a is the total stakes
for the bet, and the sign of a indicates which side Gambler is taking:
• If a is positive, then Gambler is betting on E happening. Gambler puts up
ap, which he loses to House if E fails, while House puts up að1 pÞ, which
he loses to Gambler if E happens. The total stakes are ap þ að1 pÞ, or a.
• If a is negative, then Gambler is betting against E happening. Gambler puts
up að1 pÞ, which he loses to House if E happens, while House puts
up ap, which he loses to Gambler if E happens. The total stakes are
að1 pÞ  ap, or a.
No principle of logic requires House to state odds at which Gambler can
take either side. But mathematical probability has earned our attention by its
practical successes over several centuries, and if we follow de Finetti in re-
jecting as defective all past attempts to provide objective interpretations
of probability, then we seem to be left with (1) as the only viable way of in-
terpreting this successful mathematical theory.
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In his publications, spanning more than ﬁve decades in the middle of the
20th century, de Finetti developed this interpretation from the viewpoint of the
player we are calling House. The principle that House should avoid sure loss to
Gambler was fundamental to this development.
If we agree that House should oﬀer Gambler (1) for some p, then the
principle that House should avoid sure loss leads immediately to the conclusion
that p should be unique. If House oﬀers (1) for both p1 and p2, where p1 < p2,
then Gambler can accept the p1-oﬀer with a ¼ 1 and the p2-oﬀer with a ¼ 1,
and this produces a sure gain of p2  p1 for Gambler, no matter whether E
happens or fails.
Before turning to our alternative understanding of subjective probability, we
further explore, within the Shafer–Vovk formalism, the implications of de
Finettis principle that House should avoid sure loss.
1.2. Protocols
From a thoroughly game-theoretic point of view, the game between House
and Gambler also involves a third player, who decides the outcomes on which
they are betting. Calling this third player Reality, we can lay out an explicit
protocol for the game in the style of Shafer and Vovk [26].
Probability forecasting
House announces p 2 ½0; 1.
Gambler announces a 2 R.
Reality announces x 2 f0; 1g.
K1 :¼K0 þ aðx pÞ.
This is a perfect-information protocol; the players move in the order indi-
cated (not simultaneously), and each player sees the other players moves as
they are made. We have writtenK0 for Gamblers initial capital andK1 for his
ﬁnal capital. Realitys announcement indicates the happening or failure of E:
x ¼ 1 means E happens, and x ¼ 0 means E fails. Thus aðx pÞ is the same as
(1). This is Gamblers net gain, which we can think of as the result of his paying
ap for ax; Gambler buys a units of x for p per unit.
Perfect-information protocols facilitate the exposition of some standard
arguments in de Finettis theory of subjective probability. We now illustrate
this point with two of these arguments: de Finettis argument for the addi-
tivity of probability, and an argument for the rule that relates the expected
value of a payoﬀ to the probabilities of events that determine the payoﬀ. In
both cases, we use de Finettis principle of Houses avoiding sure loss: House
should choose his probabilities and other prices so that no strategy for
Gambler guarantees Gambler a strictly positive gain no matter how Reality
moves.
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1.2.1. De Finetti’s argument for additivity
Consider the following protocol, where House gives probabilities for the
three events E, F , and E [ F :
Multiple probability forecasting
House announces pE; pF ; pE[F 2 ½0; 1.
Gambler announces aE; aF ; aE[F 2 R.
Reality announces xE; xF ; xE[F 2 f0; 1g.
K1 :¼K0 þ aEðxE  pEÞ þ aF ðxF  pF Þ þ aE[F ðxE[F  pE[F Þ.
Constraint on Reality: Reality must make xE[F ¼ xE þ xF (this expresses the
assumptions that E and F are disjoint and that E [ F is their disjunction).
The constraint on Reality is part of the rules of the game. Like the other
rules, it is known to the players at the outset.
To see that House must make pE[F ¼ pE þ pF in order to avoid sure loss in
this protocol, set
d :¼
1 if pE[F > pE þ pF
0 if pE[F ¼ pE þ pF
1 if pE[F < pE þ pF
8<
:
and consider the strategy for Gambler in which aE and aF are equal to d and
aE[F is equal to d. Gamblers net gain with this strategy is
dðxE  pEÞ þ dðxF  pF Þ  dðxE[F  pE[F Þ ¼ dðpE[F  ðpE þ pF ÞÞ;
which is positive unless pE þ pF ¼ pE[F .
1.2.2. Expected value
The preceding argument generalizes to an argument for determining prices
for payoﬀs. Suppose E1; . . . ;En are disjoint events, and suppose x is a payoﬀ
that depends on the outcomes of these events. We write E0 for the event that
none of the E1; . . . ;En happen, so that
x ¼
Xn
j¼0
ajxj;
where xj is the indicator variable for Ej, and aj is the value of x when Ej
happens.
The following protocol says that House announces probabilities for
E0;E1; . . . ;En and also a price at which Gambler can buy or sell x:
Pricing a payoﬀ
House announces p0; p1; . . . ; pn 2 ½0; 1 and p 2 R.
Gambler announces a0; a1; . . . ; an 2 R and a 2 R.
Reality announces x0; x1; . . . ; xn 2 f0; 1g and x 2 R.
K1 :¼K0 þ
Pn
j¼0 ajðxj  pjÞ þ aðx pÞ.
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Constraint on Reality: Reality must make x ¼Pnj¼0 ajxj.
In this protocol, House must satisfy
p ¼
Xn
j¼0
ajpj ð2Þ
in order to avoid sure loss. To state the strategy for Gambler that will make
money for sure if House violates (2), we set
d :¼
1 if p >
Pn
j¼0 ajpj
0 if p ¼Pnj¼0 ajpj
1 if p <Pnj¼0 ajpj
8<
: :
Setting each aj equal to daj and a equal to d, we obtain
Xn
j¼0
dajðxj  pjÞ  dðx pÞ ¼ d p
 

Xn
j¼0
ajpj
!
;
as Gamblers net gain, and this is positive unless (2) holds.
The number p, the price at which Gambler can buy or sell x, is called the
expected value or the prevision of x. Eq. (2) tells us how this price is determined
by the probabilities of the disjoint events E0;E1; . . . ;En.
1.3. Trying to beat the odds
Shafer and Vovk argue that perfect-information protocols provide a frame-
work in which to understand a broad range of applications of mathematical
probability. In many of these applications, the role of House is played by a
theory or a model, which gives probabilities that should hold in various situ-
ations. A statistician or scientist who wants to test the theory can play the role
of Gambler, trying to ﬁnd a strategy that refutes the theory by making a lot of
money.
At ﬁrst glance, this kind of testing by Gambler might seem relevant only to
an objective concept of probability. Indeed, our review of de Finettis theory
suggests that subjective probability is probability from the viewpoint of House,
not Gambler. The rules of probability result, it would seem, from Houses
motivation to avoid sure loss. But as we now show, a clear understanding of
how probabilities should change over time requires that we shift to Gamblers
viewpoint and invoke Cournots principle, thus bringing our concept of sub-
jective probability closer to the concept of objective probability. When we
assert that certain numbers are valid as objective probabilities, we are asserting
that they do not oﬀer anyone any opportunity to get very rich. When we ad-
vance them as our subjective probabilities, we are saying something only a little
diﬀerent: we are asserting that they do not oﬀer us, with the knowledge we
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have, any opportunity to get very rich. When we say this, we put ourselves in
the role of Gambler, not in the role of House. The point is not how we got the
numbers; perhaps we got them from a theory or from a diﬀerent person. The
point is what we think we can do with them.
1.3.1. Cournot’s principle
We now consider in more detail how Gambler can test probabilities.
A probability for a single event, if it is not equal to 0 or 1, can hardly be
refuted. Even if Gambler chooses the winning side, with stakes high enough to
make a lot of money, we will hesitate to conclude that the probability was
wrong. Gambler may simply have been lucky. On the other hand, if House
announces probabilities for a sequence of events, and Gambler consistently
manages to make money, then the validity of the probabilities will be cast in
doubt.
Shafer and Vovk [26] have shown that we can make this notion of testing
precise within the following protocol, where House announces probabilities
p1; p2; . . . for a series of events E1;E2; . . . with indicator variables x1; x2; . . .:
Sequential probability forecasting
K0 :¼ 1.
For n ¼ 1; 2; . . .:
House announces pn 2 ½0; 1.
Gambler announces an 2 R.
Reality announces xn 2 f0; 1g.
Kn :¼Kn1 þ anðxn  pnÞ.
In this protocol, Gambler can test Houses probabilities by trying to get
inﬁnitely rich (limn!1Kn ¼ 1) without ever risking bankruptcy (without
giving Reality an opportunity to make Kn negative for any n). If Gambler
succeeds in doing this, he has refuted the probabilities.
We ask the reader not to take the inﬁnitary aspects of this formulation too
seriously. Instead of talking about Gambler multiplying his capital by an
inﬁnite factor in an inﬁnite number of trials, we can instead talk about his
multiplying it by a large factor in a large number of trials. Because the details
of the ﬁnitary formulation are relatively complicated [26, Chapter 1], we leave
them aside here. But we will sometimes speak of Gambler ‘‘winning heavily’’ or
‘‘becoming very rich’’ instead of ‘‘becoming inﬁnitely rich’’.
Why do we insist that Gambler begin with limited initial capital K0 (it is
important only that K0 be positive and ﬁnite, not that it have the particular
positive value 1) and require that he avoid risking bankruptcy in order for his
getting very rich to be a refutation of House? One reason for this formulation is
to rule out Gamblers consistently making money by doubling his bet following
every loss until he scores a large gain ([26, p. 51]). But its real justiﬁcation is
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Shafer and Vovks demonstration that it provides a new and more general
foundation for the classical limit theorems of probability. For example, instead
of proving that the convergence of empirical frequency to probability occurs
‘‘except on a set of measure zero’’ (this is the textbook formulation of the law
of large numbers), Shafer and Vovk prove that the convergence occurs unless
Reality permits Gambler (or Skeptic, as they call him) to become inﬁnitely rich
without risking bankruptcy. More precisely, Gambler has a strategy (a rule for
moving based on Houses and Realitys previous moves) that does make him
inﬁnitely rich without risking bankruptcy unless Realitys moves converge as
required.
Shafer and Vovk use the name Cournot’s principle for the hypothesis that
Reality will not allow Gambler to become inﬁnitely rich without risking
bankruptcy (see Appendix A). This principle says that no matter what bank-
ruptcy-free strategy for Gambler we specify (in addition to Houses and
Realitys previous moves, such a strategy may also use other information
available to Gambler), we can be conﬁdent that Reality will move in such a
way that the strategy will not make Gambler inﬁnitely rich. This is an empirical
hypothesis––a hypothesis about how Reality will behave, not a rule of the
game.
If given probabilities satisfy Cournots principle for any potential gambler,
no matter how much information that gambler has, then we might call them
objective or causal probabilities [22,24]. On the other hand, if they satisfy
Cournots principle only for gamblers with a certain level of information, then
we might call them subjective probabilities for that level of information. An
individual who believes that given probabilities do not permit any bankruptcy-
free strategy to make him very rich––whether he made up the probabilities or
obtained them from a theory or another person––might reasonably call them
his personal subjective probabilities.
Under this interpretation, a person with subjective probabilities is not
merely saying that he does not know how to get very rich betting at these
probabilities. He is saying much more. He is saying that he is convinced that no
bankruptcy-free strategy that he might try can make him very rich. He will at
best more or less break even.
The appeal of Cournots principle is strengthened by a result of Dawid,
which he calls Jeﬀreys’s Law in honor of the applied mathematician and
probabilist Harold Jeﬀreys. Roughly speaking, Jeﬀreyss Law says that if two
diﬀerent systems of probabilities satisfy Cournots principle, then they will be
asymptotically equal [4].
1.3.2. Suppressing House
A person might have a rule for determining his subjective probabilities based
on what has happened in the world so far. In this case, the person can express
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the meaning of his probabilities by putting himself in the role of Gambler in a
game in which the rule replaces House.
Suppose the rule gives pn as a function of Realitys moves so far:
pn :¼ Pðx1; . . . ; xn1Þ;
where P is a function that assigns a number in the interval ½0; 1 to every ﬁnite
sequence of 0s and 1s, including the empty sequence. Such a function P can be
thought of as a strategy for House in the sequential probability forecasting
protocol. Once it is ﬁxed, House has no decisions to make, and we no longer
need to consider him as a player in the game. Writing f0; 1g for the set of all
ﬁnite sequences of 0s and 1, we can then describe the protocol like this:
Sequential probability without House
Parameter: P : f0; 1g 7!½0; 1
K0 :¼ 1.
For n ¼ 1; 2; . . .:
Gambler announces an 2 R.
Reality announces xn 2 f0; 1g.
Kn :¼Kn1 þ anðxn Pðx1; . . . ; xn1ÞÞ.
The parameter P, being part of the rules of the game, is known to both
players at the outset.
Our discussion of Cournots principle applies to this simpliﬁed protocol just
as well as to the protocol in which House plays a free role. See Chapter 3 of
[26].
In the context of Shafer and Vovks general theory, the protocol without
House is fairly special. It moves us closer, however, to the problem of planning
using subjective probabilities. Planning requires that we have some advance
information about how future events will aﬀect future possibilities and prob-
abilities.
1.3.3. Generalizing to event trees
For clarity, we have introduced Cournots principle using a relatively simple
protocol, in which Reality has a binary choice at each step. The principle can
also be adopted, however, when Reality sometimes has more than two choices,
and when the choices available to her may depend on what she has done
previously. This brings us to the generality of an event tree [19].
Fig. 1 illustrates the idea of an event tree, which we study in more detail in
Section 3. In this example, Gambler is watching the actions of a youngster. The
youngster may deliberate about his actions, but from Gamblers point of view,
these actions are moves by Reality. Gambler somehow knows in advance that
the youngster will ﬁrst either watch television, call a friend, or play his saxo-
phone. What the youngster may do next depends on this ﬁrst choice.
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Gambler may have at the outset probabilities for each step, as indicated on
the right-hand side of the ﬁgure. In this case, he is playing a game with Reality
without House. Alternatively, he may wait until the ﬁrst step is taken before
ﬁnding out or deciding his probabilities for the next step; in this case, House is
in the game. In either case, Gambler may adopt the probabilities as his sub-
jective probabilities by subscribing to Cournots principle, provided only that
the tree actually continues indeﬁnitely rather than ending after two steps as in
the ﬁgure.
1.3.4. Summary
The established understanding of subjective probability, associated with the
name of Bruno de Finetti, attributes subjective probabilities to a person when
he is willing to bet at those probabilities. But we attribute subjective proba-
bilities to a person when he believes that he cannot win heavily when he has the
opportunity to use them as betting rates. We formalize this idea by putting the
person in the role of Gambler, who plays a game against Reality. The persons
belief about his own inability to beat the probabilities is then formalized by
Cournots principle, which states expectations about Realitys behavior.
There are many ways a person might obtain the numbers he adopts as
subjective probabilities. He may have a rule for calculating these numbers. He
may rely on someone else, such as a weather forecaster, to provide them. Or he
may make them up himself as he goes along. Our sequential protocol without
House formalizes the case where he has a rule. Our sequential protocol with
House formalizes the case where someone chooses and announces the numbers
Fig. 1. An event tree. The steps are possible moves by Reality. On the right, probabilities are as-
signed to Realitys moves, making the event tree into a probability tree. The probabilities shown are
probabilities for steps. Later we discuss also probabilities for histories. The probability for the
history ‘‘watch TV, then go to bed’’, for example, is 0:5 0:1, or 0.05.
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as events proceed. Both types of protocol generalize to event trees. The pro-
tocol without House is the most interesting for planning; it generalizes to
probability trees––event trees with probabilities assigned to the steps.
1.4. Conditional probability
The usual mathematical theory of probability [2,8,10,11,27] uses the concept
of conditional probability to deal with changes in probability over time. If we
write P0 for probabilities at time 0 and Pt for probabilities at time t, then the
theory says that
P0½At \ E ¼ P0½AtPt½E; ð3Þ
where At represents what has happened by time t. Eq. (3) is often called the rule
of compound probability.
Although our notation does not make the dependence explicit, the proba-
bility Pt½E depends on At (what has happened by time t), not merely on t. It is
the conditional probability of E given At. If P0½At 6¼ 0, then we can rewrite (3) to
express Pt½E in terms of probabilities at time 0:
Pt½E ¼ P0½At \ E
P0½At : ð4Þ
This equation, the rule of conditional probability, is a rule of updating: it tells us
how probabilities at time t are determined by initial probabilities and what has
happened by time t.
The rule of conditional probability plays a particularly important role in the
theory of subjective probability. It seems quite remarkable, in fact, that a rule
of this type exists for subjective probabilities. Its existence suggests that once a
person has announced a complete set of initial subjective probabilities, he has
no future work to do; his future subjective probabilities are determined for
him. We might be able to wiggle out of this conclusion when P0½At ¼ 0 [3], but
most scholars who study subjective probability do not try to do so; instead,
they glory in the coherence of new with old beliefs represented by (3) and (4)
[1,13,18].
Why should (3) hold for subjective probabilities? The usual answer to this
question, which goes back to the 18th-century work of De Moivre and Bayes
[20,21], relies on constructing a bet on E at time t from bets on At and At \ E at
time 0. The probability (4), it is argued, can be justiﬁed by the cost of this
construction. Spelling this argument out in detail involves dealing with the
question of timing. When does House oﬀer bets, and when does Gambler have
to accept them? Diﬀerent assumptions about the timing lead to diﬀerent ver-
sions of the argument, some more convincing than others.
We now take a careful look at several of the diﬀerent versions. First (Sec-
tions 1.5 and 1.6) we look at what can be said when we take Houses point of
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view and rely only on de Finettis principle that House should avoid sure loss,
and then (Section 1.7) we look at what can be said when we shift to Gamblers
point of view and invoke Cournots principle.
1.5. Announcing future probabilities in advance
Updating by conditional probability is most inescapable under the as-
sumption that House announces at time 0 how the probability he will an-
nounce for E at time t depends on what happens by then.
Say A1t ; . . . ;A
k
t are the possibilities House foresees for what will happen by
time t. In order to write protocols that make assumptions about timing explicit,
we adopt the following notation:
• pj is Houses probability for Ajt at time 0,
• qj is Houses probability for E at time t if Ajt happens,
• rj is Houses probability for Ajt \ E at time 0,
• i is the index for which Ait actually happens, and
• x is 1 if E happens and 0 if it fails.
In the following protocol, House commits himself to the qj in advance.
Advance probability forecasting
At time 0:
House announces p1; . . . ; pk; r1; . . . ; rk; q1; . . . ; qk 2 ½0; 1.
Gambler announces a1; . . . ; ak; b1; . . . ; bk 2 R.
Reality announces i 2 f1; 2; . . . ; kg.
At time t:
Gambler announces c 2 R.
Reality announces x 2 f0; 1g.
Kt :¼K0 þ ðai 
Pk
j¼1 ajpjÞ þ ðbix
Pk
j¼1 bjrjÞ þ cðx qiÞ.
As usual, the Greek letters represent stakes for the diﬀerent bets: aj is the
total stakes for Ajt , bj the total stakes for A
j
t \ E, and c the total stakes for E.
Gamblers net gain, Kt K0, can be written in the form
ðai  cqiÞ þ xðbi þ cÞ 
Xk
j¼1
ðajpj þ bjrjÞ: ð5Þ
This expression makes it easy to show that House must obey (3) in order to
avoid sure loss. First we set
dj :¼
1 if rj > pjqj
0 if rj ¼ pjqj
1 if rj < pjqj
8<
:
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for j ¼ 1; . . . ; k. Then we prescribe for Gambler the strategy given by
aj :¼ djqj; bj :¼ dj; and c :¼ di: ð6Þ
With this strategy, Gamblers net gain, (5), becomes
ðdiqi  diqiÞ þ xðdi þ diÞ 
Xk
j¼1
ðdjqjpj  djrjÞ ¼
Xk
j¼1
djðrj  pjqjÞ:
By the deﬁnition of dj, the product djðrj  pjqjÞ is always nonnegative and is
positive unless rj ¼ pjqj. So House must make rj ¼ pjqj for all j in order to keep
Gambler from making a sure gain with this strategy. In particular, he must
make ri ¼ piqi hold, and this is merely another way of writing (3), the rule of
compound probability.
Let us summarize. We made these assumptions:
1. House knows at time 0 the possibilities for what he will have learned by
time t.
2. House announces at time 0 joint probabilities for these possibilities and the
event E.
3. House also announces at time 0 how his new probability for E at time t will
depend on how what he has learned by then.
We deduced from these assumptions that Houses advance announcements
must conform with (3), the rule of compound probability, if he is to avoid sure
loss. Assuming further that House did not assign probability zero at time 0 to
what actually happened by time t, it follows that his announcements must also
conform with (4), the rule of conditional probability. If House announces in
advance a rule for updating his probabilities, then he can avoid sure loss only if it
is the usual rule of conditional probability.
This argument generalizes readily to an event tree. If Gambler is given at the
outset probabilities for each step in the tree (this gives him a probability tree, as
in Fig. 1) and also initial probabilities for histories (sequences of steps), then
the probabilities for the steps should be related to the probabilities for the
histories by the rule of conditional probability; otherwise Gambler will have a
way to make money for sure.
In another important direction, however, the argument does not generalize.
It depends crucially on the assumption that Gambler can freely switch the sign
of any payoﬀ he is oﬀered––i.e., that he can take either side of any bet he is
oﬀered. When we drop this assumption, so that we have only lower and upper
probabilities and previsions instead of subjective probabilities and exact ex-
pected values, we will have to turn to an alternative argument based on
Cournots principle (see Section 2.4).
14 G. Shafer et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 33 (2003) 1–49
1.6. Updating when the time comes
The preceding argument does not apply when House does not announce a
rule of updating in advance. This becomes clear when we think about the
following protocol, in which House announces only at time t what he is willing
to do at time t:
Two-stage probability forecasting
At time 0:
House announces p1; . . . ; pk; r1; . . . ; rk 2 ½0; 1.
Gambler announces a1; . . . ; ak; b1; . . . ; bk 2 R.
Reality announces i 2 f1; 2; . . . ; kg.
At time t:
House announces q 2 ½0; 1.
Gambler announces c 2 R.
Reality announces x 2 f0; 1g.
Kt :¼K0 þ ðai 
Pk
j¼1 ajpjÞ þ ðbix
Pk
j¼1 bjrjÞ þ cðx qÞ.
The symbols in this protocol are the same as in the protocol for advance
probability forecasting, except that we now write simply q for Houses prob-
ability for E at time t; he does not announce probabilities that he would have
had at time t had events gone diﬀerently between time 0 and time t.
It is intuitively clear that Houses announcement of q at time t in this two-
stage protocol should not be constrained by his earlier announcements at time
0. In addition to Realitys announcement of i, House and Gambler might learn
any number of things between time 0 and time t, and so there is no reason to
suppose that Houses new probability for E should depend only on i and his
own previous announcements. This intuition is conﬁrmed by the fact that the
strategy (6), which enforces the rule of conditional probability in the advance
protocol, is not available to Gambler in the two-stage protocol. House does not
announce probabilities qj at time 0 in the two-stage protocol, and (6) depends
on having such announcements.
1.6.1. Advance oﬀers
Although House can do what he wants at time t without risking sure loss, it
remains true that his oﬀers at time 0 include what can be interpreted as oﬀers to
agree at time 0 to bets at time t. Indeed, from the oﬀers House makes at time 0,
Gambler can construct a payoﬀ that will come out the same as the payoﬀ of a
bet on E made at time t. To do this, Gambler ﬁxes a and sets
aj :¼  rjpj a and bj :¼ a ð7Þ
for j ¼ 1; . . . ; k. Gamblers net gain from these moves will be
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a x
	
 ri
pi


; ð8Þ
where i is Realitys announcement. This is the same as the net gain Gambler
would have on a bet on E at probability ri=pi and total stakes a, made at time t
after Reality announces i.
If Houses announcement q at time t is diﬀerent from ri=pi, we can say he has
changed his mind about oﬀering (8). He oﬀered (8) at time 0, but now he is
oﬀering aðx qÞ. But because Gambler did not know at time 0 whether q
would be greater than ri=pi or less than ri=pi, Gambler cannot exploit this
change to inﬂict a sure loss on House.
1.6.2. A single advance oﬀer
Gambler can also choose a particular value j0 at time 0 and construct a
payoﬀ that looks like a bet on E at time t only if Reality chooses j0. To do this,
he ﬁxes a, sets
aj0 :¼ 
rj0
pj0
a and bj0 :¼ a ð9Þ
and sets aj ¼ bj ¼ 0 for j 6¼ j0. His net gain from these moves will be
a x rj0
pj0
	 

if i ¼ j0
0 if i 6¼ j0
8><
>: : ð10Þ
This is the same as the payoﬀ from a contingent bet on E made at time 0––an
agreement to bet with stakes a on E at the conditional probability if Reality
chooses j0 at time t but not to bet at all if Reality does not choose j0.
1.6.3. Walley’s updating principle
In his treatise Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities [33], Peter
Walley states a general principle about how a persons betting oﬀers should
change when he obtains new information. Using our own terminology rather
than Walleys, we may state his principle by saying that House should oﬀer at
time 0 a particular payoﬀ that pays nothing when B fails if and only if he in-
tends to continue to oﬀer this payoﬀ if and when he learns of Bs happening and
nothing more. We state the principle more carefully in Section 2.3, and we
quote Walleys own statement of it in Appendix B. Here we merely note that in
the case at hand, where House is oﬀering (10) at time 0, the principle implies
that at time 0 House should intend to oﬀer at time t to pay rj0=pj0 for x––i.e., to
use rj0=pj0 as his new probability for E––if Reality announces j0 and this is
Houses only new information.
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Aside from observing that the payoﬀ (10) is the same whether one bets at time
0 or time t, Walley gives little argument for his principle. He appears to regard it
as a relatively self-evident principle of rationality that underlies the widespread
acceptance of conditional probability. As we will now explain, Cournots
principle leads to a clear argument for Walleys principle, an argument that
makes clear why the caveat ‘‘this is Houses only new information’’ is needed.
1.7. Updating with exact information
So far (Sections 1.5 and 1.6), our attempts to justify the rule of conditional
probability have remained within de Finettis understanding, which attributes
subjective probabilities to House, the player who announces them. We have
been looking for arguments that constrain House to obey the rule of condi-
tional probability. We now turn to look at the matter from the viewpoint we
developed in Section 1.3––the viewpoint of Gambler, who thinks he cannot
beat the probabilities. It is this viewpoint that permits a clear argument for
Walleys updating principle.
Consider a sequence of events E1;E2; . . .. These events may be substantively
very diﬀerent, but for simplicity let us suppose that House makes announce-
ments about each of them as in the two-stage protocol of Section 1.6. First, at
time n, House announces probabilities for k events and for their conjunctions
with En, and Reality decides which of the k events happens. A little later, say at
time nþ 1=2, House gives a new probability for En, and Reality decides whe-
ther En happens. This produces the following protocol:
Sequential two-stage probability forecasting
K0 :¼ 1.
For n ¼ 1; 2; . . .
At time n:
House announces pn1; . . . ; pnk 2 ð0; 1 and rn1; . . . ; rnk 2 ½0; 1.
Gambler announces an1; . . . ; ank;bn1; . . . ; bnk 2 R.
Reality announces in 2 f1; 2; . . . ; kg.
At time nþ 1=2:
House announces qn 2 ½0; 1.
Gambler announces cn 2 R.
Reality announces xn 2 f0; 1g.
Kn :¼Kn1 þ ðanin 
Pk
j¼1 anjpnjÞ þ ðbninxn 
Pk
j¼1 bnjrnjÞ þ cnðxn  qnÞ.
For simplicity, we have required House to make the pni nonzero, so that we
can freely use them as divisors.
Let us make the following assumptions:
1. Houses ﬁrst-stage announcements (his pn1; . . . ; pnk and rn1; . . . ; rnk for n ¼
1; 2; . . .) satisfy Cournots principle: Reality will not allow Gambler to
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become inﬁnitely rich following a bankruptcy-free strategy for betting at
these probabilities.
2. House agrees in advance that his second-stage announcements will obey the
rule of conditioning: he will always set qn equal to rnin=pnin .
3. The only new information Gambler acquires between his move at time n and
his move at time nþ 1=2 is Realitys choice of in. (By the preceding assump-
tion, he already knows how this will determine Houses move qn.)
4. Reality pays no attention to how Gambler moves when she chooses her
moves.
Will all of Houses announcements (the pn1; . . . ; pnk, the rn1; . . . ; rnk, and the
qn) satisfy Cournots principle as a group under these assumptions? It is rea-
sonable to conclude that they will. If they did not, then Gambler would have a
bankruptcy-free strategy S for choosing an1; . . . ; ank; bn1; . . . ; bnk at time n and
cn at time nþ 1=2 that would make him inﬁnitely rich. Because Realitys moves
do not depend on what Gambler does (Assumption 4) and House will set qn
equal to rnin=pnin (Assumption 2), Gambler has a strategy S
0 for choosing
an1; . . . ; ank; bn1; . . . ; bnk alone that makes his capital grow exactly asS does: to
duplicate the eﬀect of Ss move cn, he adds cnrnj=pnj to anj and cn to bnj, for
j ¼ 1; . . . ; k as suggested by (7). This strategy does not require knowledge of in,
and so Gambler would have the information needed to implement it (As-
sumption 3). So S0 would also make Gambler inﬁnitely rich, contradicting
Assumption 1.
This result is a new justiﬁcation of the rule of conditional probability. It tells
us that if P0½Ajt  and P0½Ajt \ E are valid probabilities for Gambler, in the sense
that he has insuﬃcient information to beat them, then the conditional prob-
ability P0½Ait \ E=P0½Ait will be equally valid as his probability for E in a later
situation where his only additional information is the observation of Ait. We
must add, of course, that this is a long-run justiﬁcation. It does not really apply
to the single case but instead assumes that there will be a sequence of similar
updating problems. It is a justiﬁcation for using the rule of conditional prob-
ability as a policy in such problems.
Insofar as we have shown that the payoﬀ (10) deﬁnes appropriate beliefs
for Gambler after Reality announces i ¼ j0, provided this announcement
is Gamblers only new information, we can also say that we have justiﬁed a
version of Walleys updating principle. We should not, however, overlook the
diﬀerences in formulation. Our argument is concerned with the long run, and it
is concerned with odds Gambler knows he will not be able to beat, not with
odds House should intend to oﬀer.
1.7.1. The concept of exact information
The crucial assumption in our argument for Walleys updating principle is
Assumption 3: Realitys move at time n, in, is the only new thing Gambler
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learns before he makes his next move. Adapting the term exact event, intro-
duced by Shafer [21], we may say that in is Gamblers exact information.
From a thoroughly subjective point of view, it is anodyne to say that
probabilities should be updated using exact information. Certainly a person
should update using all his information, and this is the same as saying that he
should use exactly what he has learned. It is truly daunting, however, to plan
ahead on the assumption that we will update our probabilities by the rule of
conditional probability using all our information. In order to condition on all
our information, we must have initial probabilities not merely for future
possibilities that interest us but for all the possibilities for exactly what we will
learn.
1.7.2. Generalizing to event trees
Our derivation of Walleys updating principle from Cournots principle
readily generalizes from the relatively rigid sequential two-stage protocol that
we have used here to an event tree, in which Realitys choices on the next step
depend on what she has done so far.
One generalization is to an event tree in which every second step represents
exact information for Gambler. (Assumption 3 for our derivation of Walleys
principle from Cournots principle was that every second step in the two-stage
sequential protocol represented exact information for Gambler.) It is also
natural, however, to consider event trees in which all steps represent exact
information for Gambler. In such trees, Gambler knows at the outset the exact
possibilities for the future step-by-step development of his knowledge. If House
states at the outset initial probabilities for all these possibilities (i.e., he states
probabilities not only for the ﬁrst step but also for the histories––the complete
paths through the tree), and Gambler adopts Cournots principle for these
initial probabilities, then our argument yields the conclusion that Cournots
principle will also hold for conditional probabilities as future probabilities. If
we place these conditional probabilities on the steps of the tree, then we again
obtain a probability tree, as in Fig. 1.
The lesson drawn here for event trees should be contrasted with the lesson
drawn in Section 1.5 for event trees. The argument in Section 1.5 was based on
the avoidance of sure loss by House, while the argument here is based on the
adoption of Cournots principle by Gambler. There is also a diﬀerence in the
conclusion. In Section 1.5, we concluded something about consistency of ad-
vance probabilities. If House gives at the outset both probabilities for steps and
probabilities for histories, then the principle of sure loss demands that they be
related by the rule of conditional probability. Here, in contrast, we have as-
sumed only that probabilities of histories are given at the outset; Cournots
principle then justiﬁes the use of the rule of conditioning to obtain probabilities
for steps.
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1.8. Summary
We have arrived at a new understanding of subjective probability. Ac-
cording to the de Finettis understanding, a persons subjective probabilities are
rates at which he is willing to bet. According to our new understanding, a
persons subjective probabilities are two-sided betting rates at which he believes
he will not win heavily, no matter what strategy for betting he follows. Our new
understanding provides a clear justiﬁcation for using conditional probabilities
as new probabilities when new information is exact––i.e., when one knows in
advance a set A1t ; . . . ;A
k
t of possibilities for exactly what all ones new infor-
mation will be.
The clarity of our new understanding encourages some questions. Does a
person always know two-sided betting rates at which he is conﬁdent he cannot
win heavily? And even if he does know such rates for some events, why should
these events include a list of possibilities for exactly what he will learn between
time 0 and time t? These questions inspire the generalizations considered in the
remainder of this article.
In its most extreme form, the theory of subjective probability assumes that
a decision maker begins with knowledge of exact possibilities for the future
development of his knowledge, together with probabilities for each of these
possibilities. We will now explore how this extreme picture can be relaxed
in order to obtain a framework that is more useful for planning. In the next
section (Section 2) we develop protocols that relax the demand for two-sided
betting rates, as well as the demand for exact information. In a later section
(Section 3), we extend this more ﬂexible approach to event trees.
2. Subjective lower and upper prevision
In recent decades, there has been great interest in supplementing subjective
probability with more ﬂexible representations of uncertainty. Some of the
representations studied emphasize evidence rather than gambling [19,28,31];
others use a concept of partial possibility [9]. But many scholars prefer to
generalize the story about betting that underlies subjective probability. The
ﬁrst step of such a generalization is obvious. Instead of requiring a person to
set odds at which he will take either side of a bet, allow him to set separate odds
for the two sides. This leads to lower and upper probabilities and lower and
upper previsions rather than additive probabilities and expected values. See the
early work of Smith [29,30] and Peter Williams [37–39], the inﬂuential work of
Peter Walley [32–35], and the recent work of the imprecise probabilities project
[5].
In this section, we look at lower and upper previsions from the point of view
developed in the preceding section. This leads to a better understanding of how
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these measures of subjective uncertainty should change with new information,
both when the new information is exact and when it is not.
We begin, in Section 2.1, by generalizing Section 1.2s protocol for subjective
probability to lower and upper previsions. In Section 2.2, we formulate and
study an abstract protocol from which lower and upper previsions can be
derived. Then we turn to the problem of updating lower and upper previsions
after the passage of time and the acquisition of new information. In Section
2.3, we state Walleys updating principle in the context of a precise protocol.
Then we derive our own principles for updating under diﬀerent assumptions. In
Section 2.4 we consider the case where future beliefs are stated in advance but
the information that is anticipated need not be exact; this is the assumption we
consider most appropriate in planning. In Section 2.5 we consider the case
where new information is anticipated exactly; in this case we obtain Walleys
principle. We summarize our results in Section 2.6.
2.1. Pricing events and payoﬀs
Lower and upper probabilities arise when we relax the requirement that
House announce odds for an event and oﬀer to bet on either side. We instead
allow him to oﬀer one set of odds for betting on the event and another for
betting against it.
Whereas probabilities for events determine expected values for payoﬀs that
depend on those events (see Section 1.2), lower and upper probabilities are not
so informative. The rates at which a person is willing to bet for or against given
events do not necessarily determine the prices at which he is willing to buy or
sell payoﬀs depending on those events. So we need more than a theory of lower
and upper probabilities for events; we also need a theory of lower and upper
previsions for payoﬀs.
2.1.1. Lower and upper probabilities
Suppose House expresses his uncertainty about E by specifying two num-
bers, p1 and p2. He oﬀers to pay Gambler
a1ðx p1Þ ¼ a1ð1 p1Þ if E happensa1p1 if E fails

ð11Þ
for any a1 P 0, and he also oﬀers to pay Gambler
a2ðx p2Þ ¼ a2ð1 p2Þ if E happensa2p2 if E fails

ð12Þ
for any a2 P 0. In (11), Gambler sells a1 units of x for p1 per unit, while in (12),
he buys a2 units of x for p2 per unit.
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Here is the protocol:
Forecasting with lower and upper probabilities
House announces p1; p2 2 ½0; 1.
Gambler announces a1; a2 2 ½0;1Þ.
Reality announces x 2 f0; 1g.
K1 :¼K0  a1ðx p1Þ þ a2ðx p2Þ.
To avoid sure loss, House must make p16 p2. If p1 > p2, then Gambler can
make money for sure by making a1 and a2 strictly positive and equal (buying at
p2 what he sells at p1).
House would presumably be willing to increase his own payoﬀs by de-
creasing p1 in (11) and increasing p2 in (12). The natural question is how high
House will make p1 and how low he will make p2. We may call p1 and p2
House’s lower and upper probabilities, respectively, if House will not oﬀer (11)
for any value higher than p1 and will not oﬀer (12) for any value lower than p2.
When we model our beliefs by putting ourselves in the role of House, we
have some ﬂexibility in the meaning we give our refusal to oﬀer higher values of
p1 or lower values of p2. Perhaps we are certain that we do not want to make
additional oﬀers, perhaps we are hesitating, or perhaps we are providing merely
an incomplete model of our beliefs (Walley [33, pp. 61–63]).
When we instead model our beliefs by putting ourselves in the role of
Gambler, the question is what values of p1 and p2 we believe will satisfy
Cournots principle. In the context of a sequence of forecasts, we might call p1
and p2 Gambler’s lower and upper probabilities when (1) Gambler believes that
no strategy for buying and selling will make him very rich in the long run when
he can sell x for p1 or buy it for p2 but (2) Gambler is not conﬁdent about this in
the case where he is allowed to sell x for more than p1 or buy it for less than p2.
Here again clause (2) can be made precise in more than one way. Gambler
might be unsure about whether he can get very rich with more advantageous
values of p1 or p2, or he might believe that a strategy available to him would
succeed with such values.
2.1.2. Lower and upper previsions
In order to price a payoﬀ x that depends on the outcome of more than one
event, we can generalize directly the protocol for forecasting with lower and
upper probabilities:
Forecasting with lower and upper previsions
House announces p1; p2 2 R.
Gambler announces a1; a2 2 ½0;1Þ.
Reality announces x 2 R.
K1 :¼K0  a1ðx p1Þ þ a2ðx p2Þ.
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Again, Gambler is allowed to sell x for p1 and buy it for p2. If p1 is the highest
price at which Gambler can sell x (either the highest price House will oﬀer or
the highest price at which Gambler believes Cournots principle, depending on
which viewpoint we adopt), we may call it the lower prevision of x. Similarly, if
p2 is the lowest price at which Gambler can buy x, we may call it the upper
prevision of x. (The terms lower and upper prevision appear to be due to Peter
Williams [39].)
Although its meaning is clear, this protocol is not ideal for a discussion of
Houses or Gamblers uncertainty about x. House may have more to say about
x than the lower and upper previsions p1 and p2, and even the statement that
these are lower and upper previsions is not exactly a statement about the
protocol itself. We now turn to a more abstract approach, better suited to
general discussion.
2.2. Forecasting in general
Consider a set R, and consider a setH of real-valued functions on R. We call
H a belief cone on R if it satisﬁes these two conditions:
1. If g is a real-valued function on R and gðrÞ6 0 for all r 2 R, then g is in H.
2. If g1 and g2 are in H and a1 and a2 are nonnegative numbers, then
a1g1 þ a2g2 is in H.
We write CR for the set of all belief cones on R.
Intuitively, a belief cone is a set of payoﬀs that House might oﬀer Gambler.
Condition 1 says that House will oﬀer any contract that does not require him to
risk a loss. Condition 2 says House will allow Gambler to combine any two of
his oﬀers, in any amounts.
The following abstract protocol is adapted from p. 90 of [26].
Forecasting
Parameters: R and C  CR
Protocol:
House announces H 2 C.
Gambler announces g 2 H.
Reality announces r 2 R.
K1 :¼K0 þ gðrÞ.
We call any protocol obtained by a speciﬁc choice of R and C a forecasting
protocol. We call R the sample space.
We call a real-valued function on the sample space R a variable. Houses
move H, itself a set of variables, determines lower and upper previsions for all
variables. The lower prevision for a variable x is
EHx :¼ supfajða  xÞ 2 Hg ð13Þ
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and the upper prevision is
EHx :¼ inffajðx aÞ 2 Hg: ð14Þ
These deﬁnitions are similar to those given by Walley ([33, pp. 64–65]). There
is a diﬀerence in sign, however, because Walley considers a collection D of
payoﬀs that House is willing to accept for himself rather than a collection H
that House oﬀers to Gambler.
The condition ða xÞ 2 H in (13) means that Gambler can sell x for a. So
roughly speaking, the lower prevision EHx is the highest price at which Gam-
bler can sell x. We say ‘‘roughly speaking’’ because (13) tells us only that
Gambler can obtain a x for a arbitrarily close to EHx, not that he can obtain
ðEHxÞ  x. Similarly, the upper prevision EHx is roughly the lowest price at
which Gambler can buy x.
Once we know lower previsions for all variables, we also know upper pre-
visions for all variables, and vice versa, because
EHx ¼ EHðxÞ
for every variable x. For additional general properties of lower and upper
previsions, see Chapter 2 of Walley [33] and Chapters 1 and 8 of [26].
2.2.1. Coherence
We call a forecasting protocol coherent if C contains at least one belief cone
H such that for every g 2 H there exists r 2 R for which gðrÞ6 0. This means
that House can avoid sure loss.
Our use of ‘‘coherent’’ follows Shafer and Vovk [26]. In cases where Houses
moves are ﬁxed, so that the game reduces to a game between Gambler and
Reality (as in Section 3.2 of [26] or Section 1.3.2 of this article), our formu-
lation simpliﬁes; in these cases, the protocols being ‘‘coherent’’ means simply
that Gambler cannot make money for sure. Appendix C discusses related uses
of ‘‘coherent’’ and ‘‘incoherent’’.
If H satisﬁes the condition that for every g 2 H there exists r 2 R with
gðrÞ6 0, then
EHx6 EHx
for every variable x. See Section 8.3 of [26].
2.2.2. Regular protocols
Given H 2 CR, set
H :¼ fx : R 7!RjEHx6 0g:
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The following facts can be veriﬁed straightforwardly:
• H is also a belief cone (H 2 CR),
• H  H,
• EHx ¼ EHx and EHx ¼ EHx for every variable x, and
• ðHÞ ¼ H.
Intuitively, if House oﬀers Gambler all the payoﬀs in H, then he might as
well also oﬀer the other payoﬀs in H, because for every payoﬀ in H, there is
one in H that is arbitrarily close to being at least as good.
We call a forecasting protocol regular if H ¼ H for every H in C. Because
any forecasting protocol can be replaced with a regular one with the same
lower and upper previsions (enlarge each H in C to H), little generality is lost
when we assume regularity. This assumption allows us to remove the ‘‘roughly
speaking’’ from the statements that the lower prevision of x is the highest price
at which Gambler can sell x and the upper prevision the lowest price at which
he can buy it. It also allows us to say that H is completely determined by its
upper previsions (and hence also by its lower previsions):
x 2 H if and only if EHx6 0:
The condition x 2 H says that House will give x to Gambler. The condition
EHx6 0 says that House will sell x to Gambler for 0 or less.
2.2.3. Bayesian protocols
The protocols for subjective probability we studied in Section 1.2 have the
property that ifH avoids sure loss by House, then EHx ¼ EHx for every variable
x. The common value of EH and ExH is, of course, xs expected value. We call a
forecasting protocol with this property Bayesian. A regular coherent fore-
casting protocol is Bayesian if and only if for each H 2 C, either x or x is
in H.
When the sample space R is inﬁnite and endowed with a r-algebra, some
readers may prefer to require EHx ¼ EHx only for measurable x. We will not
explore this issue, because we draw our motivation from the particular pro-
tocols in Section 1.2, not from the general concept of a Bayesian protocol.
2.2.4. Interpretation
Both interpretations of lower and upper previsions we discussed in Section
2.1 generalize to forecasting protocols in general. We can put ourselves in the
role of House and say that our beliefs are expressed by the prices we are willing
to pay––our lower and upper previsions. Or, as we prefer, we can put ourselves
in the role of Gambler and subscribe to these prices in the sense of believing
that they will not allow us to become very rich in the long run, no matter what
strategy we follow.
The reference to the long run in the second interpretation must be under-
stood in terms of a sequential version of our abstract protocol. If we suppose,
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for simplicity, that Reality and House have the same choices on every move,
this sequential protocol can be written as follows:
Sequential forecasting
Parameters: R and C  CR
Protocol:
K0 :¼ 1.
For n ¼ 1; 2; . . .:
House announces Hn 2 C.
Gambler announces gn 2 Hn.
Reality announces rn 2 R.
Kn :¼Kn1 þ gnðrnÞ.
The ambiguities we discussed in Section 2.1 also arise here. If we take
Houses point of view, we may or may not be categorical about our unwill-
ingness to oﬀer riskier payoﬀs than those in Hn. If we take Gamblers point of
view, we may be more or less certain about whether larger Hn would also
satisfy Cournots principle.
2.3. Walley’s updating principle
We turn now to Peter Walleys updating principle. As we saw in Section 1.6,
this principle entails the rule of conditional probability when it is applied to
subjective probability. Now we apply it to our abstract framework for lower
and upper previsions.
We begin by generalizing the two-stage protocol we considered in Section
1.6.
Two-stage forecasting
Parameters: R, a disjoint partition B1; . . . ;Bk of R, C  CR
Protocol:
At time 0:
House announces H0 2 C.
Gambler announces g0 2 H0.
Reality announces i 2 f1; 2; . . . ; kg.
At time t:
House announces Ht 2 CBi .
Gambler announces gt 2 Ht.
Reality announces r 2 Bi.
Kt :¼K0 þ g0ðrÞ þ gtðrÞ.
Because we are considering how House should make his second move, we
leave this move unconstrained by the protocol. House can choose any belief
cone on the reduced sample space Bi.
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Walleys updating principle says that if House knows at time 0 that Realitys
announcement of i will be Houses only new information when he moves at
time t, then at time 0, as he makes his move H0, House should intend for his
move Ht to be the belief cone w
i
t on Bi given by
wit :¼ fg : Bi 7!Rjg" 2 H0g; ð15Þ
where g" is deﬁned by
g"ðrÞ :¼ gðrÞ if r 2 Bi
0 if r 62 Bi

: ð16Þ
In words: House should intend to oﬀer a given payoﬀ at the second stage after
Reality announces i if and only if he is already oﬀering that payoﬀ at the ﬁrst
stage contingent on that value of i. This produces simple formulae relating the
new lower and upper previsions to the old ones:
Ewit x ¼ supfajEH0ðx aÞ
" P 0g ð17Þ
and
Ewit x ¼ inffajEH0ðx aÞ
"6 0g ð18Þ
for every variable x on the reduced sample space Bi.
A comparison of (16) with (10) conﬁrms that the statement of Walleys
updating principle given here agrees with the statement we gave in Section 1.6.
See Appendix B for Walleys own statement of his updating principle.
2.4. Announcing future beliefs in advance
As we learned in Section 1.5, the rule of conditional probability is mandated
by the principle of Houses avoiding sure loss when he announces future
subjective probabilities in advance. What can we say when House announces in
advance future beliefs that determine only lower and upper previsions?
Advance forecasting
Parameters: R, a disjoint partition B1; . . . ;Bk of R, C  CR.
Protocol:
At time 0:
House announces H0 2 C and Hjt 2 CBj for j ¼ 1; . . . ; k.
Gambler announces g0 2 H0.
Reality announces i 2 f1; 2; . . . ; kg.
At time t:
Gambler announces gt 2 Hit.
Reality announces r 2 Bi.
Kt :¼K0 þ g0ðrÞ þ gtðrÞ.
The strategy for enforcing the rule of conditional probability that we studied
in Section 1.5 exploited the two-sided nature of the betting oﬀers in the
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probability protocol; Gambler could switch the signs of his payoﬀs as he
pleased. Because the protocol we are now studying is not necessarily Bayesian
(x 2 H0 does not necessarily imply x 2 H0), this ﬂexibility is not available. We
can, however, make an argument from Gamblers point of view, relying on
Cournots principle.
Consider Houses H0 and his H
j
t for some particular j. Suppose the variable
g is in Hjt , but g
" is not in H0. Then it would make no diﬀerence in what
Gambler can do if House were to enlarge H0 by adding g
" to it. He can already
get the eﬀect of g" at time 0 by planning in advance to announce g at time t.
So we can assume, without changing what Gambler can accomplish, that if
g 2 Hjt , then g" 2 H0. This assumption implies wjt  Hjt by (15) and then
EHjt
6 Ewjt ð19Þ
by (13). The lower prevision at time t that is foreseen and announced at time 0
should not exceed the lower prevision given by Walley’s updating principle.
Writing simply E0x for EH0x and Etx for EHit x (the lower previsions that Houses
time-0 announcements imply for time 0 and t, respectively) and recalling (17),
we can write (19) in the form
Etx6 supfajE0ðx aÞ" P 0g; ð20Þ
where x is a variable on the reduced sample space Bi.
The argument for (20) relies on the new viewpoint developed in this article,
according to which a persons uncertainty is measured by prices he believes he
cannot beat, not by prices he is disposed to oﬀer. We expect (20) to hold because
if it did not, the time 0 lower previsions would need to be increased to reﬂect
stronger betting oﬀers that Gambler cannot beat. Strictly speaking, of course,
talk about Gambler not being able to beat given prices is talk about the long
run, and so a complete exposition of the argument would involve a sequential
protocol, in which advance forecasting is repeated a large or inﬁnite number of
times. We leave this further elaboration of the argument to the reader.
The argument does not rely on any assumption about exact information.
Possibly House and Gambler will learn more than Bi by time t. We should keep
in mind, however, that Etx, in (20), is not necessarily the lower prevision at time
t. It is merely the lower prevision at time t to which House commits himself at
time 0. This commitment does not exclude the possibility that House and
Gambler will acquire additional unanticipated information and that House will
consequently oﬀer Gambler more variables at time t than those to which he
committed himself at time 0. In this case, the actual lower prevision for x at
time t may come out higher than EHit x and even higher than Ewit x.
For planning at time 0, we are interested in what we can count on already at
time 0. This is why the upper bound in (20) is interesting. When time t comes
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around, positive unanticipated information may lead us to give x a lower
prevision exceeding this upper bound, but there is also the possibility of neg-
ative unanticipated information, and the upper bound can be thought of as
telling us how conservative we need to be in our advance commitments in order
to hedge against the possible negative information.
The complexity and subtlety of this analysis contrasts with the simplicity of
our analysis of the advance protocol for subjective probabilities in Section 1.5.
We may explain the contrast by pointing to the strength of the assumption that
House can set two-sided betting rates in advance. The argument of Section 1.5
does not assume explicitly that new information is anticipated exactly, but
from our new point of view, the assumption that House can set two-sided
betting rates in advance based on i alone is not sensible unless we do indeed
know in advance that there will be no other new information, or at least no
other relevant new information. Otherwise, some kind of hedge against the
unanticipated is in order, and this leads away from two-sided advance oﬀers
and subjective probabilities, to unequal preannounced lower and upper pre-
visions.
2.5. Updating with exact information
Although the case we have just analyzed, where commitments are made in
advance in the face of possible unanticipated new information, seems to us to
have greater practical importance, it is also of interest to consider the case
where new information is anticipated exactly. This is the case where Walleys
principle applies, and as we now show, the derivation of Walleys principle
from Cournots principle that we presented for subjective probabilities in
Section 1.7 does generalize to lower and upper previsions.
Extending the two-stage protocol of Section 2.3 just as we extended the two-
stage probability forecasting protocol of Section 1.6 in Section 1.7, we obtain
the following sequential protocol:
Sequential two-stage forecasting
K0 :¼ 1.
For n ¼ 1; 2; . . .
At time n:
House announces Hn0 2 C.
Gambler announces gn0 2 Hn0.
Reality announces in 2 f1; 2; . . . ; kg.
At time nþ 1=2:
House announces Hn1 2 CBin .
Gambler announces gn1 2 Hn1.
Reality announces rn 2 Bin .
Kn :¼Kn1 þ gn0ðrnÞ þ gn1ðrnÞ.
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We reason just as in Section 1.7. First, we make the following assumptions:
1. Houses Hn0 satisfy Cournots principle.
2. House agrees in advance to follow Walleys updating principle: Hn1 ¼ winn ,
where wjn :¼ fg : Bj 7!Rjg" 2 Hn0g.
3. The only new information Gambler acquires between his move at time n and
his move at time nþ 1=2 is Realitys choice of of in. (By the preceding as-
sumption, he already knows Houses move Hn1.)
4. Reality pays no attention to how Gambler moves when she chooses her
moves.
Will all of Houses announcements (the Hn0 and Hn1) satisfy Cournots
principle as a group? It is reasonable to conclude that they will. If they did not,
then Gambler would have a bankruptcy-free strategy S that would make him
inﬁnitely rich. This strategy would specify gn0 2 C for n ¼ 1; 2; . . . and gjn1 2 wjn
for n ¼ 1; 2; . . . and j ¼ 1; . . . ; k. Because Realitys moves do not depend on
what Gambler does (Assumption 4) and House will follow Walleys recom-
mendation forHn1 (Assumption 2), Gambler has a strategyS
0 for choosing the
gn0 alone that makes his capital grow exactly as S does: to duplicate the eﬀect
of Ss move gn1, he adds ðgjn1Þ" to Ss gn0 for j ¼ 1; . . . ; k. This strategy does
not require knowledge of in, and so Gambler would have the information
needed to implement it (Assumption 3). So S0 would also make Gambler in-
ﬁnitely rich, contradicting Assumption 1.
This result is a long-run justiﬁcation for Walleys updating principle in its
full generality.
2.6. Summary
In this section we have used Gamblers viewpoint to understand lower and
upper previsions and their updating.
Here as in the case of subjective probability (see Section 1.8), the proper
handling of updating depends on whether we can exactly anticipate new in-
formation.
• We learned in Section 2.5 that if we can exactly anticipate new informa-
tion––i.e., if we have an exhaustive advance list B1; . . . ;Bk of possibilities
for exactly what all our new information will be, then we can follow Walleys
updating principle, deriving new lower previsions from old ones using the
formula
Etx ¼ supfajE0ðx aÞ" P 0g: ð21Þ
• We learned in Section 2.4 that if we cannot exactly anticipate new informa-
tion, but we do know that we will learn which of the mutually exclusive
events B1; . . . ;Bk has happened, and we commit ourselves in advance to
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lower previsions that depend on which Bi happens, then these preannounced
lower previsions should satisfy the upper bound
Etx6 supfajE0ðx aÞ" P 0g: ð22Þ
The requirement of exact new information is very strong. The inequality (22)
depends only on the weaker condition that we learn which of the B1; . . . ;Bk
happens. There is no requirement that this be all we learn. On the other hand,
the inequality only bounds the new lower prevision that can be guaranteed
at the outset, at the planning stage. Unanticipated information may actually
produce a higher lower prevision.
3. Subjective uncertainty in event trees
We now sketch a theory of lower and upper previsions in event trees. As we
explained in Section 1.3.3, the framework provided by an event tree is more
general than the framework provided by the protocols we have been studying,
because the moves available to Reality in an event tree may depend on her
previous moves. On the other hand, we simplify at the outset by suppressing
House. As in Section 1.3.2, we assume that Gambler is told at the outset what
variables will be oﬀered to him in each possible situation in the tree. This as-
sumption is appropriate for planning, in which we must make assumptions at
the outset not only about our current uncertainty but also about our uncer-
tainty in future situations.
We do not assume that our event tree provides a protocol for exact antici-
pation of new information. In other words, we build on the argument of
Section 2.4 rather than the argument of Section 2.5. What Gambler learns
following a particular situation in the tree is not necessarily represented exactly
by one of the steps to the right of that situation. We assume that Reality will
take one of these steps, and that Gambler will know which step Reality takes
when she takes it, but this might not be all that Reality does, and it might not
be all that Gambler learns. When Gambler is in a situation in the tree, he
knows it, but he may also know more. He may know more and believe more
than he anticipated at the planning stage.
We begin this section by characterizing event trees mathematically (Section
3.1). Then we use an example to clarify our interpretation of event trees
(Section 3.2). After explaining how uncertainty in an event tree can be de-
scribed by a collection of belief cones––a belief structure, as we call it (Section
3.3), we look at the lower and upper previsions determined by belief structures
(Section 3.4).
An important aspect of our interpretation of event trees is our acknowl-
edgement of the possibility of reﬁnement. As we explain in Section 3.2.3,
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Gambler may know both that he is in a situation S in one event tree and
also that he is in a more detailed version of S in a more reﬁned event tree.
The beliefs speciﬁed for S by the belief structure on the less reﬁned tree will
not be contradicted by the more detailed belief structure on the more reﬁned
tree.
3.1. What is an event tree?
Formally, an event tree is a setT of objects (situations) partially ordered by
time. We write 6 for the partial order, and we assume that 6 has the fol-
lowing properties:
1. S6 S for all S 2T.
2. If T 6 S and S6R, then T 6R.
3. If S6R and R6 S, then R ¼ S.
4. If T 6 S and T 6R, then R6 S or S6R.
Properties 1–3 are the usual rules for partial order. Property 4 makes the
partial order a tree.
When S6R, we say that S follows R. This means that S, if it happens,
happens after or at the same time as R. Writing S6R when S follows R clashes
with the convention that later times are represented by larger numbers, but it is
imposed by our need to keep our notation consistent with the theory of event
spaces, in which S6R has a more general meaning, encompassing both or-
dering by time and ordering by speciﬁcity [25].
When R6 S or S6R, we say that S and R are ordered. So we can state
Property 4 by saying that any two situations that follow a third situation are
themselves ordered.
As Shafer [19] explains, the abstract concept of an event tree is very ﬂexible.
It allows for the possibility that Reality might sometimes have inﬁnitely many
choices for her next step. It also allows for the possibility that there is no initial
situation in the tree; there might instead be inﬁnite sequences of earlier and
earlier situations. When we use an event tree for planning, however, we assume
that there is an initial situation and that we are in it.
3.1.1. Sample spaces and variables
A history (perhaps we should say a possible future history; we are looking
towards the future, not the past) is a complete path through the tree––a
complete account of how the events the tree tracks might unfold through time.
Formally, a history is a maximal set of ordered situations––a subset r of T
such that every pair of situations in r is ordered and this is true of no larger
subset of T that contains r. When a situation S is in a history r, we say that r
goes through S.
We call the set of all histories the sample space, and we designate it by R. We
call the set of histories that go through S the reduced sample space for S, and we
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designate it by RS . We call a real-valued function on R a variable. We call a
real-valued function on RS a variable on S. This is the kind of variable that
might be oﬀered to Gambler when he is in S.
If S6R and x is a variable on S, then we write x"R for the variable on R given
by
x"RðrÞ :¼ xðrÞ if r goes through S
0 otherwise

ð23Þ
for all r that go through R. An oﬀer of the variable x"R in R can be thought of as
a contingent oﬀer––an oﬀer of x provided Reality later arrives in S.
If S6R and x is a variable on R, then we write x#S for the variable on S given
by
x#SðrÞ ¼ xðrÞ
for all r that go through S.
3.1.2. Clades and cuts
We call a subset U of an event treeT a clade if no two distinct situations in
U are ordered. This is equivalent to saying that no history goes through more
than one situation in U. We say that a variable x is measurable with respect to
a clade U if for any situation S in U and for any pair of histories r1 and r2 that
go through S, xðr1Þ ¼ xðr2Þ. In words: x is constant on the histories that
go through a given situation in U.
We call a nonempty clade U a cut of a situation R if every history that
goes through R goes through exactly one situation in U at the same time or
later.
3.2. How to interpret an event tree
The event trees that we consider in this section must be understood in re-
lation to our two players, Reality and Gambler. We now explain how we see
this relationship.
We can say that an event tree represents possibilities for what Reality will
do. Each step is a possible move by Reality. But as we explain in Section 3.2.2,
it is better to think of the tree as a collection of assertions about what Reality
will not do––what is impossible. This is the real empirical meaning of the tree,
inasmuch as it can be refuted.
We assume that Gambler sees Realitys steps as they are taken, and thus the
steps also represent possibilities for what Gambler will learn. We may make
this vivid by saying that Gambler moves from situation to situation with Re-
ality. In Fig. 2, for example, Gambler and Reality move to situation S1 when
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Bill removes the teakettle from the ﬁre. Gambler knows when he is in a given
situation in the tree, although we do not rule out the possibility that he also
knows more. This is the epistemic meaning of the tree.
Standing back a step, we can think of an event tree as a tool for planning by
a person who places himself in the role of Gambler. It expresses the persons
assumptions about certain events whose happening or failing he expects
to follow, but it does not purport to make exhaustive predictions about what
else the person will observe, even in relation to these events. Some steps on
the tree may be determined by decisions that the person himself makes,
either in the planning process or later. In this respect, the person is part of
Reality.
3.2.1. Situations as instantaneous events
Each situation in an event tree is to be understood as a situation at a precise
instant of time. In Fig. 2, the timing might be tied down as follows:
• R might be deﬁned by Gamblers actual initial state of knowledge. He is
standing in Bills kitchen watching him, and R is what Gambler knows of
the situation in the kitchen as he points to Bill.
• S1 is the situation where Bill has just removed the teakettle from the ﬁre.
• S2 is the situation where the teakettle has remained on the ﬁre just long en-
ough that its whistling is inevitable.
• T1 and T2 are situations where Bill has just picked up the teakettle to pour the
hot water into his teapot.
• U1 and U3 are situations where Bill has just burned himself.
• U2 and U4 are situations where Bill has just ﬁnished giving his guests their
tea without having burned himself.
Fig. 2. Another event tree. We call the nodes situations or instantaneous events.
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Because the situations are instantaneous, we can also think of them as
events. A situation is the same as the instantaneous event that the world (or
Reality, as we have been saying) arrives in that situation.
The statement that the situations in the tree are instantaneous should not be
interpreted as meaning that they have a clock time assigned to them in ad-
vance. Fig. 2 does not tell us, for example, exactly what time Bill might burn
himself.
3.2.2. Impossibility
According to Fig. 2, it is impossible for the teakettle to whistle (T2) unless it
is left on the ﬁre (S2). Moreover, the teakettle will remain on the ﬁre unless Bill
removes it (either S1 or S2 must happen). It will not move or disintegrate of its
own accord, and no man-made or natural catastrophe is about to destroy the
entire kitchen. These two examples illustrate two general rules of interpretation
for an event tree:
• If there is an arrow from S to T , then T can only happen if S happens ﬁrst.
It is impossible for T to happen without S happening ﬁrst.
• If there are k arrows from R, where k > 0, say arrows to S1; . . . ; Sk, then ex-
actly one of these k situations must happen after R happens. It is impossible
that S1; . . . ; Sk should all fail to happen or that more than one of them
should happen.
The impossibilities that follow from these rules constitute the immedi-
ate empirical meaning of an event tree. We say the tree is empirically valid if
these impossibilities are correct––i.e., if they are not refuted by subsequent
events.
An event tree makes assertions about what is possible as well as assertions
about what is impossible. Only the assertions of impossibility, however, can be
directly tested. Who is to say, after that fact, whether something that did not
happen had really been possible? It is for this reason that we treat the assertions
of impossibility as the empirical meaning of the tree. We treat possibility as an
epistemic matter––a fact about what one knows from being in a situation
rather than a fact about the world. We hasten to add that we consider this
epistemic treatment of possibility appropriate only for a subjective theory of
probability. A theory of objective probability and causality based on event
trees, such as the theory in [22], must treat possibility as an aspect of the
world––an aspect that persists as one learns more.
3.2.3. Reﬁnement
No event tree can show more than a fragment of what happens in the
world––a fragment of what Reality does. There is always more to be said about
the current state of the world and possibilities for the future. Fig. 3 shows a bit
of additional detail that might lie beneath Fig. 2s assertions about Bills
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teamaking. This ﬁgure reﬁnes Fig. 2 by splitting T1 into two situations, T11 and
T12, depending on whether Bill is pouring the hot water into the small or large
teapot. A person who knows that he is in T11 and knows Fig. 3 knows more
at this point than a person who knows only that he is in T1: he knows Bill is
going to burn himself. But nothing he knows contradicts the impossibilities
announced by Fig. 2. The two event trees can be simultaneously empirically
valid.
In addition to splitting situations, we can also reﬁne by interpolating situ-
ations to represent intermediate events. In general, this involves reﬁning what
looks like an individual step into chains, or multiple chains, which branch
according to the outcome of the intermediate events. Examples are given in
[22,23,25]. (The notion of reﬁnement used here diﬀers, however from the ob-
jective concept of reﬁnement used in [22], which does not permit possibilities to
be ruled out by reﬁnement. See also the discussion in [36].)
We say that an event tree is epistemically valid if Gambler knows at the
outset that he will know when and if he arrives in a given situation in the tree.
A tree can fail to be epistemically valid even though it is empirically valid, and
even though it reﬁnes an epistemically valid event tree.
We will assume that the event tree we are working with is both empirically
and epistemically valid. This assumption is appropriate for planning, because it
is reasonable to make plans about what to do in future situations––what in-
formation to gather and what actions to take––only if we can assume we will
know when to carry out these plans.
The need for epistemic validity underlies our insistence that a situation in
our event tree might not be assigned a determinate clock time. Presumably we
can always specify a range of possible times for each situation in the tree, and
Fig. 3. A reﬁnement of Fig. 2. It gives more information about what might cause Bill to burn
himself if he removes the teakettle from the ﬁre before it whistles.
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presumably we could reﬁne the tree by splitting each situation into separate
situations, each labeled by one of these possible times. But if we are not always
watching the clock, then this reﬁnement may fail to be epistemically valid for
us. It may also be quite unnecessarily cumbersome.
3.3. Belief structures on event trees
In the protocols of Section 2, Gambler expressed his beliefs about what
would happen next by adopting Cournots principle with respect to given belief
cones. We now generalize this idea to event trees.
Because an event tree can be reﬁned by the interpolation of intermediate
events, we do not want to lean on the notion of what happens next. So we allow
the variables in the belief cone adopted by Gambler for a given situation to
depend on any number of future steps by Reality, not just on the next step.
(This ﬁts the deﬁnition of variable we gave in Section 3.1.2.) We call the col-
lection of these belief cones a belief structure.
3.3.1. Deﬁnition
Consider a set B of pairs of the form ðx; SÞ, where S is a situation in our
event tree and x is a variable on S. We write hxjSi to indicate that the pair ðx; SÞ
is in B. We call B a belief structure if the following principles are satisﬁed:
1. Rationality: If x is a nonpositive variable on S (this means that xðrÞ6 0 for
all r through S), then hxjSi.
2. Additivity: If hx1jSi and hx2jSi, then hx1 þ x2jSi.
3. Scaling: If a is a nonnegative real number and hxjSi, then haxjSi.
4. Contingency: If S6R and hxjSi, then hx"RjRi.
We suppose that B is adopted by Gambler at the outset, before he ac-
companies Reality through the event tree. His adoption of B means that he
thinks the oﬀers in it (an oﬀer of x if and when he is in S for every ðx; SÞ in B)
are not enough to allow him to get very rich.
The ﬁrst three principles, rationality, additivity, and scaling, are the prin-
ciples underlying our deﬁnition of belief cone in Section 2.2. They require the
set of x for which ðx; SÞ is in B to be a belief cone for each ﬁxed S.
The fourth principle, contingency, is justiﬁed by the argument we learned in
Section 2.4. Because Gambler will know if and when he arrives in S, he can
plan in R to accept the oﬀer of x that he knows he will have in S if he arrives
in S. This plan can be adopted at the same time and has the same eﬀect as
accepting an oﬀer of x"R in R. So if Cournots principle is valid for the oﬀer of x
in S, then it is also valid for an oﬀer of x"R in R, where Gambler knows less.
All four principles can be thought of ways of enlarging a set of variables
oﬀered to Gambler. We can start with an arbitrary set of variables and use each
of the four principles as a rule for adding others. If x in a nonpositive variable
on S, then we can add hxjSi. If hx1jSi and hx2jSi are already in the set, then we
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can add hx1 þ x2jSi, and so on. The set formed by all variables that can be
obtained in this way in a ﬁnite number of steps may be called the closure of the
initial set of variables. It will satisfy all four conditions and thus qualify as a
belief structure.
Fig. 4 illustrates contingency. The event tree at the top of the ﬁgure shows
that if it rains on Monday, then Gambler can bet on it raining again on
Tuesday. The event tree at the bottom shows the same oﬀer, made on a con-
tingent basis on Sunday evening. The two bets have the same payoﬀs, and if
Gambler cannot get rich exploiting oﬀers on Monday evening, then he cannot
get rich exploiting the corresponding contingent oﬀers on Sunday evening,
when he knows less about the future.
Fig. 5 illustrates how a belief structure might extend to a valid reﬁnement.
At the top we have that same tree that we saw in Fig. 2, with one variable
Fig. 4. Oﬀering a bet contingently.
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oﬀered in S1 and another oﬀered in T2. At the bottom we have the reﬁnement
we saw in Fig. 3, with the same two oﬀers. For both trees, we consider the belief
structure obtained by taking the closure of the two gambles oﬀered. By con-
tingency, the variable oﬀered in T2 is also oﬀered in S2. But the variable oﬀered
in S1 is not oﬀered in T1 in the tree at the top. The only variables oﬀered in T1
are those introduced by rationality. Gambler is not oﬀered any bet on whether
Bill will burn himself. Our assumption that the reﬁnement is epistemically valid
Fig. 5. Belief structures for Figs. 2 and 3.
G. Shafer et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 33 (2003) 1–49 39
makes this quite appropriate, for when Gambler is in T1 he is also in either T11
or T12, and hence he knows whether Bill will burn himself or not.
In general, reﬁnement can reveal more variables available to Gambler. But
neither these additional variables nor the additional knowledge indicated by
the reﬁnement should invalidate Gamblers adoption of Cournots principle for
the belief structure on the less reﬁned event tree.
3.3.2. Other properties
Here some properties that a belief structure may or may not have:
• Coherence: The structure is coherent if whenever hxjSi there is a path r going
through S such that xðrÞ6 0.
• Regularity: The structure is regular if hxjSi whenever hx jSi for every
 > 0.
• Walley update: The structure is Walley updated if hxjSi whenever x is a vari-
able on S, S6R, and hx"RjRi.
• Temporal decomposability: The structure is temporally decomposable if when-
ever hxjRi and U is cut of R, there exists a variable y such that (1) y is mea-
surable with respect to U, (2) hyjRi, and (3) hðx yÞ#S jSi for each S 2 U.
We discussed coherence for forecasting protocols in Section 2.2.1. We cer-
tainly want our belief structures to be coherent. If we discover, in the course of
enlarging an initial set of oﬀers using the ﬁve deﬁning conditions, that Gambler
is oﬀered a sure gain in S, then we will have refuted Gamblers adoption of
Cournots principle for the structure. But this incoherence might be diﬃcult to
discover, and so it is convenient to leave coherence out of the deﬁnition of
belief structure.
We discussed regularity for forecasting protocols in Section 2.2.2. As we
noted there, it is a convenient property. Moreover, it has a virtue in common
with the four principles we have assumed for belief structures: it can be in-
terpreted as an instruction for enlarging a set of oﬀers. But we are interested in
implementing the ideas in this article in a practical logic, and it is not clear how
such a logic could make use of an inﬁnite number of premises, one for each
 > 0. So we also leave regularity as an auxiliary condition.
Walley update is the converse of our principle of contingency. The two
together constitute Walleys updating principle. As Walley himself would
agree, it is appropriate to demand Walley update only when the event tree is
interpreted as a protocol for exactly anticipated new information. So it cer-
tainly should not be included in our deﬁnition of belief structure. Walley [33]
studies the implications of Walley update at length. We study the concept
further from our own point of view in [14].
Temporal decomposability says that Gambler can always decompose an
oﬀer in R into two successive oﬀers, the ﬁrst of which is settled in U. The
variable x oﬀered in R may still be unsettled in U, but there must be another
variable y oﬀered in R that is settled in U, such that in each situation S in U,
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Gambler can buy x for the amount he gets there from y. Gambler can accept y
in R and then perhaps wait until U to decide whether to buy x for the payoﬀ
he has obtained from y. The sequential protocols that we studied in Section 2
deﬁne temporally decomposable belief structures, because the variables oﬀered
there are always immediately settled. We single out the concept of temporal
decomposability here only in order to point out that it is not required by our
general concept of a belief structure on an event tree. Fig. 6 shows a belief
structure that is not temporally decomposable.
3.4. Lower and upper prevision
A belief structure determines lower and upper previsions in an event tree just
as a belief cone does in a forecasting protocol. In the case of the belief structure
in an event tree, the lower and upper previsions are relative to the situation.
The lower and upper previsions in S for a variable x on S are deﬁned, of
course by
ESx :¼ supfajha xjSig
and
ESx :¼ inffajhx ajSig:
These quantities have the properties we would expect from our work in Section
2. For example,
ESx ¼ ESðxÞ
Fig. 6. A weather forecaster oﬀers to gamble on whether it will rain the day after tomorrow but not
on whether it will rain tomorrow. On Sunday evening, he oﬀers $0.25 for a return of $1 if it rains
during the day on Tuesday. The oﬀer is only for Sunday evening; he will no longer gamble on
Tuesdays weather after he has seen Mondays. The belief structure he oﬀers to Gambler is not
temporally decomposable.
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whenever x is a variable on S, and
ESx6 supfajERðx aÞ"R P 0g
whenever x is a variable on S and S6R.
If the belief structure is coherent, we obtain
ESx6 ESx:
If it is regular, we obtain
hxjSi if and only if ESx6 0:
If it is Walley updated, we obtain
ESx ¼ supfajERðx aÞ"R P 0g
whenever x is a variable on S and S6R.
In order to see the eﬀect of temporal decomposability on lower and upper
previsions, we need another deﬁnition. Given a situation R, a variable x on R,
and a cut U of R, write EUx for the variable on R given by
ðEUxÞðrÞ :¼ ESðrÞx#SðrÞ;
where SðrÞ is the situation in U that r goes through, and deﬁne EUx analo-
gously. In general, we have
ERxP ER½EUx and ERx6 ER½EUx;
but when the belief structure is temporally decomposable, this can be strength-
ened to
ERx ¼ ER½EUx and ERx ¼ ER½EUx:
See [26, pp. 184–185].
For additional discussion of the properties of lower and upper previsions,
see [33] and Section 8.3 of [26].
4. Further perspectives
We have developed a simple mathematical framework for representing
subjective uncertainty through time. This framework has many traditional el-
ements, but it relates subjective uncertainty to gambling in a novel way. Instead
of emphasizing that prices for uncertain payoﬀs should avoid sure loss, it
emphasizes a persons conviction that he cannot get rich at these prices.
The framework is also distinguished by the ﬂexibility of its assumptions
about future information. The beliefs it speciﬁes for a future situation where we
have given knowledge are not invalidated if it turns out, when we arrive in that
situation, that we know even more.
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In this concluding section, we oﬀer some additional perspectives on this new
framework. We emphasize the simplicity of its principles (Section 4.1). We
explain how it is motivated by the problem of planning (Section 4.2). We
discuss how it might deal with the distinction between updating and revision
(Section 4.3). And ﬁnally, we discuss how it can be further developed using the
concept of an event space (Section 4.4).
4.1. Two principles
Early in the 20th century, the French mathematicians Jacques Hadamard
and Paul Levy suggested that probability theory is founded on two principles
([26, p. 44]). The ﬁrst principle says that if a gambler can make either of two
bets, he can make them both. This is a mathematical principle, and it leads to
the fundamental property of mathematical probability: probabilities add. The
second principle is not a mathematical principle; rather it is a principle that
connects mathematical probability with reality. This is the principle that an
event with very small probability will not happen.
At its core, our framework is merely an elaboration of Hadamard and
Levys two principles. Our deﬁnition of a belief structure formalizes the prin-
ciple of additivity. Our version of Cournots principle is a generalization of the
principle that an event with very small probability will not happen.
4.2. Uncertain reasoning
Event trees and the belief structures on them are purely mathematical ob-
jects. We have designed them, however, to serve as part of a semantics for
languages for planning under uncertainty.
A language for planning under uncertainty must name events, describe
possible actions and their outcomes in terms of these events, and describe the
planners uncertainty both about the behavior of the world and the outcomes
his own actions. We propose that instantaneous events or situations should be
taken as the fundamental concept in such a language, and that statements
of uncertainty about such events should expressed by gambles be interpreted
using Cournots principle. Our four properties for event trees and our four
principles for belief structures can be translated into rules for reasoning about
assertions in such a planning language.
This article has not done any of the work that will be involved in developing
such languages. But the modular character of our semantics should contribute
to make this work practical. Our notion of reﬁnement will facilitate the de-
scription of events, because it authorizes us describe diﬀerent events at diﬀerent
levels of detail. Our principles for belief structures will allow us to construct
belief structures from individual oﬀers to gamble.
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4.3. Updating and revision
There is a sizeable literature, going back at least to work of Levi [17] and
G€ardenfors [12] in the 1980s, that considers how knowledge should be revised
with experience. Many recent contributions to this literature, including an
inﬂuential contribution by Katsuno and Mendelzon [15], emphasize the dis-
tinction between bringing a knowledge base up to date when the world it de-
scribes changes (‘‘updating’’) and revising a knowledge base to incorporate new
information about a static world (‘‘revision’’).
The analysis in this article suggests that this distinction between updating
and revision is not simple for subjective probability or subjective lower and
upper prevision. Our steps in our protocols and trees include changes in the
world (moves by Reality), but these changes are also learning steps for the
person who is cast in the role of Gambler. The two aspects cannot be disen-
tangled, and the abstract theory applies equally well to examples in which the
changes are substantial changes external to the person who plays Gambler and
to examples where the changes are little more than changes in Gamblers
knowledge.
On the other hand, a belief structure on an event tree can only be an im-
perfect plan, drawn up by an imperfect planner and subject to revision. Several
kinds of revision are possible and important. The most innocuous revision is
reﬁnement––the addition of more detail to the event tree or the addition of
more gambles to the belief structure, raising some of our lower previsions. The
most severe is empirical refutation. And as we learned in Section 2.4, we may
increase our lower previsions in the course of events even when nothing hap-
pens to refute our belief structure.
A belief structure is best thought of, perhaps, as a plan. Plans are seldom
followed for very long. Even when a plan is working well, we usually quickly
obtain enough new insight to make its revision worthwhile. So no matter how
long-term a belief structure on an event tree is, we may expect to change it
before we have followed Reality for many steps.
4.4. Event spaces
Although event trees are more ﬂexible than protocols for representing un-
certainty, a single event tree cannot represent all the future situations we will
want to consider in a planning problem. Our reasoning in such problems will
be based on rules (rules about what Reality is allowed to do next, rules that
specify probabilities or gambles for what Reality will do next, rules for gath-
ering information, perhaps even rules for taking substantive actions) that are
triggered when a situation satisﬁes certain premises. Some rules will require
more speciﬁcity about the situation than others. Yet an event tree is limited to
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one level of speciﬁcity; it cannot include situations at diﬀerent levels of speci-
ﬁcity such as T1 and T11 in Figs. 2 and 3.
In [25], we propose a formalism that treats situations in abstraction from
any particular event tree in which they might be represented. In this formalism,
we treat on an equal basis not only situations that are ordered in time, but also
situations that are ordered by speciﬁcity. These situations form an event space.
The principles that we have stated for a belief structure in an event tree
readily extend to an event space. We can also add a principle that formalizes
our comments in connection with Fig. 5 on p. 47: any variable that is included
in the belief structure for a given situation should also be included for any
reﬁnement of that situation.
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Appendix A. Cournots principle
Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801–1877) was one of the ﬁrst proponents of
what came to be called the frequentist conception of probability. He also
enunciated what has sometimes been called Cournots principle: an event with
probability zero will not happen. This principle, together with the law of large
numbers, implies that probabilities will be matched in the world by frequencies.
In this article, we have followed Shafer and Vovk [26] in using ‘‘Cournots
principle’’ to name a more general principle, which applies to sequential
gambling oﬀers that fall short of determining probabilities: Gambler cannot
take advantage of the oﬀers to become inﬁnitely rich.
The concept of probability zero is not necessarily applicable to our proto-
cols, because they do not necessarily allow us to say whether a given event has
probability zero or not. The protocol for sequential probability forecasting in
Section 1.3, for example, requires only that House give a probability for each
En after E1;E2; . . . ;En1 have been settled; it does not require House to give a
joint probability measure for E1;E2; . . . and hence does not require him to say
whether a given event deﬁned by E1;E2; . . . has probability zero. But if House
did give such a joint probability measure, then Shafer and Vovks version of
Cournots principle could be considered a consequence of the principle Cour-
not advocated, because when Gambler followed a strategy that did not risk
bankruptcy, his capital would be a nonnegative martingale with respect to the
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probability measure, and the event that a nonnegative martingale diverges to
inﬁnity has probability zero.
We must distinguish Cournots principle from the principle of Houses
avoiding sure loss. Both principles limit Gamblers ability to make money. But
they diﬀer sharply in other ways:
• The principle of Houses avoiding sure loss is a constraint on House. It for-
bids House from choosing probabilities that will permit Gambler to arrange
to make money from House no matter how Reality moves. This is a hard
constraint; it constrains Houses probabilities in speciﬁc and precise ways.
• Formally, Cournots principle is a constraint on Reality. It forbids Reality
from moving in such a way that Gambler can make too much money in
the long run. This is a soft constraint; it does not constrain Reality much
on any single move.
Of course, House must avoid sure loss in order for Reality to be able to obey
Cournots principle. Moreover, we do not expect Reality to obey Cournots
principle unless House chooses his probabilities properly.
Appendix B. Peter Walley on updating
In Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities [33], Peter Walley paints
a picture in which a person is disposed to agree to certain gambles. Following
de Finetti, Walley calls this person ‘‘You’’, but ‘‘You’’ is analogous to our
‘‘House’’, inasmuch as he expresses beliefs by oﬀering gambles. So far as we
have noticed, Walley does not discuss a counter party; there is no Gambler in
the picture.
Walley states his updating principle on p. 287 in these words: ‘‘Any gamble
Z is B-desirable if and only if BZ is desirable.’’ The terms in this statement are
deﬁned as follows:
• A gamble (payoﬀ) is desirable, roughly speaking, if You are disposed to
accept it (p. 615).
• B is an event that You will observe to happen or fail.
• A payoﬀ Z is B-desirable if You ‘‘intend to accept’’ Z provided You observe
‘‘just the event B’’ (p. 287).
• The payoﬀ BZ is equal to Z if B happens and 0 otherwise.
If we identify Walleys You with our House and identify You being disposed
to accept Z with Houses oﬀering )Z to Gambler, then this becomes the
principle that we stated in Section 2.3.
Walley argues for his updating principle with the following comments
• ‘‘. . .the time at which gambles are accepted does not aﬀect their value.’’ (p.
294)
• ‘‘The two dispositions mentioned in the updating principle have the same
eﬀect.’’ (p. 288)
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In the last paragraph of Section 6.1.6 on p. 288, Walley argues that in the
Bayesian case violation of his updating principle may commit a person to
accepting two gambles that together cannot produce a gain and may produce a
net loss. This is not conﬁrmed, however, by our analysis of the two-stage
Bayesian protocol of Section 1.6. There Gambler cannot make House suﬀer a
loss if House does not disclose in advance how he will violate the updating
principle (whether his new probability for E will be greater or less than the
value implied by his betting oﬀers at time 0).
Appendix C. ‘‘Incoherence’’
The use of ‘‘coherent’’ and ‘‘incoherent’’ in probability theory seems to have
originated with Bruno de Finetti. In a seminal article ﬁrst published in French
in 1937, [6], de Finetti considered a person––let us call him House––who oﬀers
odds at which he will bet for or against various events. De Finetti suggested
that these odds should ﬁt together with each other, or cohere, in such a way
that House would not be vulnerable to Gamblers selecting a portfolio of
bets that would produce a net loss for House no matter how the events come
out. If the odds did not have this property, they would be called incoherent. De
Finetti showed that coherence is suﬃcient to establish the classical properties
of probability. In later work [7], de Finetti reformulated these ideas in terms of
prices a person sets for buying or selling uncertain payoﬀs.
It would be unfair to call a person incoherent for refusing to play De Finettis
game––i.e., for refusing to oﬀer all comers prices at which he will both buy and
sell. But once he does agree to the game, it relatively reasonable to call his
prices incoherent when he opens himself up to a sure loss.
In the looser games of Section 2, where House may oﬀer distinct buying and
selling prices, criticism of these prices becomes more complicated. Here are two
distinct ways we might criticize them:
• Vulnerability to Sure Loss. If House merely states prices at which he will buy
certain variables, then perhaps we can combine various of his oﬀers in such a
way that he pays more than he will get back no matter how events come out.
In this case, his prices are incoherent in de Finettis original sense.
• Understatement. If House not only states prices at which he will buy certain
variables but also states that these are his maximum prices for these vari-
ables, then we may be able to refute one of his statements––say the statement
that a is the most he will pay for x, by combining various of his other buying
oﬀers in such a way that what he is buying adds up to x and what he pays for
it adds up more than a. In this case, we may say that his statements about
what he is willing to pay are incorrect.
In this article, we say that prices avoid sure loss when they are coherent in De
Finettis original sense. This leaves the words ‘‘coherent’’ and ‘‘incoherent’’
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available for other roles. So we apply them to protocols: a protocol is coherent
if House is permitted to avoid sure loss. This is also the way the term is used by
Shafer and Vovk [26].
Walley and some other authors use ‘‘incoherent’’ to criticize systems of
prices for understatement. They call a system of buying prices incoherent
whenever the buying price given for one variable is less than the buying price
that can be derived from buying prices given for other variables. Moreover,
they allow the derivation to include not only the combination of oﬀers but also
the application of other principles to which they subscribe, such as Walleys
updating principle. This leads to the unpleasant situation where someone who
considers the updating principle inapplicable to a particular problem risks
having his beliefs labeled ‘‘incoherent’’ for this reason.
We suggest that this use of ‘‘incoherent’’ be discontinued. It is impolite to
label systems of prices that some people ﬁnd reasonable incoherent, and it is
disingenuous, in those circumstances, to pretend that the word is an innocuous
technical term.
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